“Stalinist Distortions” and their Implications for the Philippine Left

The collapse of the socialist order in Eastern Europe (EE) has affected all those who believe in the ideals of socialism. Experience has now shown us that the Soviet variant of socialism is not viable (anymore?). The difficult tasks that face Marxists everywhere are: first, to define what went wrong; and second, to build a new consensus regarding the shape of the socialism that we want to build.

Many Philippine Marxists, however, see the problems that brought down socialism in EE as important to study but not immediately relevant. Thus, we may tend to be interested and concerned, and even a little bothered, but we are not compelled by tactical considerations to address these problems.

There are many reasons for this. First of all, we are engaged in a life-and-death struggle which demands almost all of our attention and energy. Second, only a very small part of the left had links with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and other Eastern European CPs . Thus, material support from them was negligible. Third, the mainstream Philippine left had until recently considered the CPSU as revisionist, and the SU and EE countries as either distorted socialist or non-socialist. Fourth, most alternative programs for a post-revolutionary Philippines integrate both socialist and capitalist elements.

Perhaps our relative distance from the crisis of socialism has put us in a good position to study it fruitfully. The issue is a theoretical debate, mostly about what to do after the present struggle. Although the Philippine left is not exactly united about what the immediate post-revolutionary society should look like, the various groups will not change their programs (at least, not right away) on the basis of EE developments. We can all afford to be objective and thorough in our studies.

However, we should not postpone our study of the socialist crisis. Postponement would be bad because after some time, theoretical arguments in the international debate will have hardened, making the insights available to us less rich, and less objective. Also, a thorough study now may make it possible to develop unity among the various Philippine left groups – especially on the socialist vision as applied to the Philippines.

Development debates are always best done when none of those debating holds state power. We cannot avoid having to debate in the course of socialist construction, but to settle the bigger points early might help us avoid many problems e.g. the Stalinist purges. Development debates at that stage will take the form of struggles for control of state power, and it is often difficult to avoid violence and massive economic dislocations in such a situation.

What is the debate about? Let us quote the editorial staff of Ang Bayan in their January-February 1991 issue: “Central to the debate is the question of how to sum up the various contradictions that underlie the socialist dilemma. Where lies the root of socialism’s present crisis? One contention is that it is brought about by the gradual though steady and ultimately successful restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.
“According to this school of thought, the difficulties of early socialism, the prevalence of small commodity production, forces of old habits and values, the relentless encirclement and sabotage by the international bourgeoisie, the rise of bureaucratism, and the abandonment of the line of the centrality of class struggle.... provided great opportunities to the re-emergent bourgeoisie to capture state and communist party leadership. From then on, the state and the party became instruments for the exploitation and oppression of the people, who ultimately rose up in revolt to overthrow the so-called socialist governments.

“The other contention is that socialism’s crisis is primarily caused by... Stalinist distortions of the socialist system or the institutionalization of the command-administrative set-up in the economy, politics, culture and ideology of socialist society.... such colossal deformations took place in response to the difficulties and problems posed by early socialism, the civil wars and imperialist encirclement and wars of re-conquest, launched against the Soviet Union.

“What emerged was a thoroughly bureaucratized state and party machinery governed by a privileged stratum. this stratum became more and more divorced from the people, assuming inordinate power over production, appropriation and distribution of the social wealth, dominating politics and culture, and monopolizing ideological formation of society... The whole thing was a huge aberration, but not a regression to capitalism.”

Such is the formulation of the debate within the CPP, at least according to Ang Bayan. In the actual debate, we need to consider the many dynamics that have come into play in Eastern Europe. The communist regimes there did not just fall; many CPs ere able to negotiate good terms for withdrawing from their monopoly of political and economic power. There were movements for socialist reform both within and outside the ruling parties. External factors, especially the Soviet Union’s Perestroika, pushed domestic changes. And of course, many anti-socialist groups were very active in the whole process.

In this paper, we will try to show that it was the Stalinist socialist model itself that failed. Other factors, e.g. sabotage by the international bourgeoisie and internal weaknesses within the ruling parties contributed to the crisis, but did not cause it. This position is somewhat different from AB’s second contention.

We propose to look at Stalinism as not merely a “distortion” of the socialist system, but as a choice (and for some time, it looked like the most logical choice) from among a number of alternative strategies for socialist construction. The experience with this model, however, shows us that this choice (i.e. Stalinism) was actually wrong, a dead-end.

The very grave violations of human rights that were committed under Stalin were associated with, but not essential to, the Stalinist model. This is shown by the much lower level of human rights violations after Stalin’s death, even though the model for socialist construction remained the same. This distinction between the Stalinist model and the excesses of Stalin is important. We wish to go beyond the critique of the excesses of Stalin, into a critique of his model for socialist construction.

When we refer to the Stalinist model, it includes the whole package of economic, political and cultural policies for constructing socialism that was first employed by the CPSU under the leadership of Stalin.

It is difficult to separate “Leninism” from “Stalinism” in terms of their theories on how to concretely build socialism. This is because Stalin claimed (correctly so, to some extent) to be continuing the line set down by Lenin.

Evils of Capitalism?

There are those who point to the current problems in Eastern Europe as evidence that the former set-up was correct. For them, it was the “evils of capitalism” that caused the crisis. Pedro Andap an advocate of this idea, said: “... socialist countries that have sought integration into the world economy and adjusted or ‘reformed’ their domestic economic policies accordingly, in the hope of accelerating their development, have become afflicted with the evils of capitalism and undergone political turmoil....

“... Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary have been outstanding in securing loans from and trade accomodations with the capitalist countries and in promoting economic policies favorable to domestic private entrepreneurs and merchants as well as to foreign investors and banks... What is construed by the propagandists as the failure of socialism may be better described as the evils of capitalism running rampant in countries that still regard themselves as socialist....”

If we follow Andap’s reasoning that the source of the crisis in EE is the introduction of capitalist elements into the socialist economies, then the original “real socialism” in EE must have been basically sound. However, if the real socialism in EE was sound, then why did the leaders of these countries feel compelled to change, if not abandon, the orthodox model?

A very convenient answer to this question is that the ruling parties in these countries were thoroughly infiltrated by bourgeois elements, that they were dazzled by the West’s apparent success, and that imperialist propaganda and economic sabotage had taken their toll. Thus, external forces are ultimately the cause of socialism’s current crisis. In order to avoid a similar crisis, all that CPs in power have to do is to constantly ensure their ideological purity and guard against infiltrators. This conclusion is very dangerous, because this will make CPs more intolerant of deviations from the orthodox model.

This line of reasoning is full of holes. For instance, it does not explain why communist parties in basically sound socialist countries would be so vulnerable. Also, when was the corruption supposed to have started? If it started early on, then how could these corrupt parties have established sound socialist systems? If the socialist system established in EE were not sound, this would mean that it was the defects in their socialist systems, and not capitalist evils, which caused their problems.

It is easier to blame subjective factors for the collapse of socialist regimes in EE than to question basic concepts that we have held for so long. As Marxists, we need to go deeper into the analysis of this phenomenon, to look into (possible) problems with the model itself, and seek the internal and objective bases for the present crisis.

Socialist Construction under Stalin

The orthodox model for socialist construction was developed during the 1920s and 1930s in the Soviet Union, under Stalin’s leadership. Because of a combination of reasons, Stalin’s proposals won out over other equally socialist proposals that were put forward by Bukharin, Trotsky and others.

The civil war and the imperialist encirclement of the then only socialist country, plus the constant threat of economic or military intervention, convinced many in the CPSU of the need to be totally self reliant and to have a strong army. These goals called for giving emphasis to heavy industrialization.

The Bolshevik fear of the mobilization of sections of the peasantry by the former ruling classes against soviet power were not without basis. This made the CPSU determined to eradicate what they saw were capitalist tendencies within the peasantry. However, we should also note that Bolshevik policies towards the peasantry contributed to peasant hostility against them.

The Great Depression in the capitalist world during the 1930s demonstrated graphically the defects of an unplanned system. A system of 5-year plans was seen to be superior to one which utilized markets.

The Soviet Union inherited the vast territory of the Russian Empire. It had the natural resources need to build a truly self-reliant economy.

On the basis of the particular situation of the Soviet Union, and of the CPSU’s understanding of what the building of socialism entailed, the CPSU formulated a model which was to become synonymous to socialism for decades. The main economic features of the model were two: the command economy and rapid heavy industrialization.

The command economy meant that the whole economy was run on the basis of 5-year plans, which covered all aspects of the economy. The logic of the command economy required state ownership of the means of production, at least for the industrial sector. Agriculture was organized into state farms and cooperatives, and in such a way that agricultural production could be integrated in the plan.

The rapid development of heavy industries was another basic feature of the Stalinist strategy. The emphasis was on the development of a self-reliant industrial base. Capital goods were to be produced domestically as early as possible, and production should expand rapidly. Agricultural surplus was used for investments in heavy industry. Shortages of consumer goods was seen to be only temporary. Once the heavy industries were developed, it would be possible to produce more than enough consumer goods.

Stalin’s model for socialist construction had its (perceived) political requirements. Most important among these is the one-party state. The communist party had to exercise control over the whole process of formulating and implementing the all-embracing economic plans. It was not possible to share real power with non-proletarian forces. This would have meant a slowing down of the industrialization drive, and allowed the bourgoeisie to subvert the process of socialist construction. The party should lead non-party organizations. This meant that these organizations were either co-opted or controlled. All those which remained independent were suppressed.

Another political requirement was the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the new Soviet state. It was seen as important to build a strong military, in order to protect the country against imperialist aggression.

All these features looked logical, given the circumstances. It is not surprising that a majority of the CPSU supported the Stalinist model over alternatives which advocated a slower rate of growth, closer integration with the world market, light industries and agriculture as priorities, decentralized economic decision making and greater roles for capitalist elements.

In addition to the above-mentioned features, socialism in the SU also had other features such as: the full employment policy, the comprehensive social security system, the utilization of the country’s surplus product for its own needs, and many formal democratic rights. These and other positive elements of the Stalinist system were not the main focus of the development debate within the CPSU, since there was general agreement about their desirability. If another model for building socialism had been adopted by the CPSU, it would most likely also have these positive features. Thus, even though the Stalinist model included them, it is possible to conceptually separate these from the more distinctive features of the Stalinist model.

Stalinism is a comprehensive model for building socialism. It encompasses not only the political, but also the economic and cultural spheres. What is more often denounced by critics of Stalinism are its political aspects. These critics often miss the intimate relationship between the different aspects of this model. As a result, they then propose to solve one part of the model, while leaving other parts unchanged.

The Command Economy

The cornerstone of the Stalinist economic model is the command economy. Under this system a 5-year economic plan governed the economic life of the whole society. This plan was drawn up in two stages. In the first stage, a draft plan was made by the central planning bodies. This draft plan was then subjected to discussions (negotiations) at all levels, down to the enterprises. After this discussion process was completed, the plan was then finalized. It then went back through the various economic units, which formulated more particular targets on the basis of the overall plan. Fulfillment of these targets became the main task of the various economic units.

The plan specified the physical output targets of all economic units, the prices for all inputs and outputs, the flow of goods between enterprises, and investments. The prices of raw materials and intermediate goods were computed based on their state-determined priorities – low prices for essentials, and high prices for luxury products. Government expenditures, external economic relations and even research and development priorities were guided by the overall plan.

The model allowed workers to participate in the process of economic planning. Through the years, the central planning authorities exercised more and more influence over this process, while the basic production units lost any real role in formulating targets.

This concentration of economic power is easily pounced upon by some critics of Stalinism. For them, the problem is one of commandism – meaning, that the central authorities imposed their plan without (sufficient) democratic consultation.

While no one would disagree that commandism in the economy is a problem, we should not stop at this point of the critique. First of all, the political monopoly of the communist party, combined with the 5-year planning process, is almost sure to result in the centralization of economic authority. Secondly, democratic participation in the Soviet-style planning process would at most have ensured that the entreprises got targets which they could realistically achieve, and that the flow of goods to and from the enterprises worked well. However, the bigger problems caused by the command economy would not have been affected by the democratic planning procedures.

For an account of the economic consequences of the command economy, let us refer to what the Czechoslovak communists said about it in 1968. According to Ota Sik (chief architect of the Czechoslovak economic reforms from 1965 to 1968) : “... prices became mere accounting units... and ceased to perform the economic functions of expressing true production costs and reflecting the market situation... profits ceased to have any bearing on the survival or even the operation of enterprises... losses entailed no disadvantages for enterprises, since it was impossible to determine whether such deficits were the result of inefficient operations or of the price system... The state administered the redistribution of funds from those enterprises which enjoyed profits to those enterprises showing deficits... The official practice of ... siphoning off excess funds from enterprises... had the effect of killing any interest enterprise managers might have had in improving efficiency.

“As... production quotas escalated... with each passing year, enterprises responded by changing their product mix, giving preference to the manufacture of those products which permitted the producer to show greater aggregate output in terms of prices – either because the products required more costly material inputs (which were automatically reflected in higher output prices) or because the official price of the selected product was higher than for an alternative item requiring the same input of labor.” This meant that a factory producing nails, for example, would tend to produce more of the heavier type of nails, and less of the smaller nails, because this allowed it to meet its production targets.

“The result was a continuing decline in the manufacture of products with low material costs and disadvantageous prices... Enterprises were... attracted to the most wasteful utilization of materials and production capital.”

“... the distorted system of pricing and administrative control of production fostered the output of an assortment of goods which was totally unrelated to the ... needs of consumers... Growing quantities of the unneeded products were forced on consumers either by direct administrative pressure or by the economic pressure of shortage or non-availability of other, more necessary goods. Despite these pressures, stocks of useless and un-saleable goods continued to grow from one year to the next... “

“The overriding interest of enterprises in expanding the volume of production militated against any consistent concern with quality, innovation, or technological improvement. The inflexible, politically-imposed structure of production likewise put heavy brakes on technological advance and modernization of the production base...”

The defects mentioned by Ota Sik were caused by the basic features of the command economy, namely the system of setting physical output targets and the artificial price system. Commandism was a result of these features, and an aggravating factor to the defects of the command economy.

The Czechoslovaks were not the only ones who identified such problems. The CPs in Poland, Hungary, and of course Yugoslavia pointed out similar problems. All except Yugoslavia were prevented by the SU from abolishing the command economy.

Rapid Heavy Industrialization

Another basic feature of Stalinism is the strategy of rapid growth of heavy industries. Some of the reasons for this drive were:

1. The Soviet Union was surrounded by enemies. It had to build a strong military in order to protect itself;
2. The SU faced economic boycott and blockade from the rest of the world. It had to build a self-reliant industrial base;
3. A solid heavy industrial base, especially in the capital goods industries, would mean an increased capacity to produce goods in other sectors of the economy. Heavy industries were seen as the motor of growth.

Also, heavy industrialization was expected to increase the ranks of the proletariat. This was seen as important for the future political stability of the workers’ state. Ideologically, heavy industry symbolized the growing strength of socialism. Socialism was (and still often is) seen as a society with very high levels of production. Rapid heavy industrialization was an attempt to reach that high production level as quickly as possible.

The heavy industrialization strategy meant that the surplus from other sectors of the economy was mainly invested in heavy industry. Investments in agriculture and consumer goods production suffered as a result. Consequently, the peasantry was hit twice. On the one hand, the state required them to sell their agricultural produce at prices that were kept artificially low. On the other hand, consumer goods were in short supply or were very expensive. When agricultural production lagged, the soviet state forced the pace of agricultural collectivization and introduced capital-intensive methods.

The neglect of agriculture was not the only negative effect of this strategy. Other effects include:

1. Forced savings, due to the unavailability of consumer goods. The rapid expansion of the work force in the heavy industries increased the demand for products from agriculture and the consumer goods industries. However, the output of these economic sectors could not grow as fast as the purchasing power of the greatly expanded work force (which, in the heavy industries, were paid high wages). Since the prices of the products were not allowed to rise in response to the high demand, the workers were forced to save this “extra” money. This “savings overhang” is a potential source of inflation. The moment prices are set free, the prices for many consumer goods are sure to skyrocket.
2. Slower economic growth. Big infrastructure projects and capital goods industries tied down huge amounts of capital for long periods while these were built. Economic benefits from them were realised only after many years. By contrast, agriculture and consumer goods industries use relatively less capital, employ more workers, and produce economic benefits much faster. Because these more productive sectors were given less priority in the economic plan, economic growth was slower than it would otherwise have been.
3. Investment funds hunger. The drive for rapid growth, with emphasis on the expansion of the capital goods industries, required ever growing amounts of investment funds. Since money was always (theoretically) available, there was no mechanism to limit investment plans. The wild scramble for investment funds, especially “hard money”, resulted in domestic and foreign debts.
4. Activities such as construction, transport and storage of products, and government administration were not given enough funds. Because of this, bottlenecks occur (e.g. government red tape, delays in construction, spoilage of products) which affect the other sectors of the economy.

The One-Party State

The one-party state is a feature which is almost universal among socialist and socialist oriented countries. Even where the CP had abandoned the heavy industrial bias (e.g. the Khmer Rouge in Kampuchea), or where the command economy was abolished (e.g. Yugoslavia, until recently), we find the one-party state as the preferred arrangement.

Our concept of a one-party state is not limited to the cases where there was literally only one party. In most countries of EE, the CPs nominally shared power with the so-called “block parties”. Since these parties were under the control of the CPs (some CPs even had to approve persons elected to leadership positions in the block parties) they didn’t really act as political parties.

There are two strong reasons for the “popularity” of the one-party state arrangement among Marxists in power. First of all, the process of revolutionary change very often needs to be led by a vanguard party. Especially where the ruling class’ grip on power is so strong, only a tightly knit, highly disciplined party could be able to lead a revolution to victory. The intense polarization of society after such a struggle often makes it very difficult to defend the gains of the revolution without maintaining a tight grip on state power.

In addition, a command economy could not work well without the tight supervision of a ruling party. Since prices didn’t serve as the regulatory mechanism in the command economy, the framework for reconciling conflicting economic goals was the planning process. This process is very political, especially since there was no objective measure for choosing between alternatives. Under a multiparty system, the political conflicts caused by the command economy would result in economic and political paralysis. The present situation in the Soviet Union demonstrates this point dramatically.

In Yugoslavia, which didn’t have a command economy, the party was seen as the unifying force of society. It was also the channel through which Yugoslavia’s “self-managed” enterprises were persuaded to conform to certain priorities for the overall economy (e.g. wage rate policies).

The one-party state fits in well with the command economy and the rapid heavy industrialization strategy. The party would ensure that the plan gets implemented. The party could also easily suppress those who (threaten to) protest against the state’s economic strategy, where they advocate other strategies (e.g. the Socialist Revolutionaries in the SU), or they are disadvantaged by these policies (e.g. the peasantry).

The one-party state saddled the party with the day-to-day administration of the economy and the state. After some years, the communist party became an administrative structure – a party of bureaucrats. Concentrating all responsibility and power in the vanguard party made the rest of the population lose all sense of participation in society. When the mass organizations became mere channels for government propaganda and mobilizations, even they lost their vitality and popular appeal. The people became depoliticized and disempowered. This disempowerment is especially tragic because socialism is supposed to expand people’s control over the state and the economy.

With the proletarian party in absolute control, socialist construction became a one-dimensional process. The party then emphasized class conflict and imperialist sabotage as the main problems of society. This was the only way such a party could justify its continued monopoly of power. This resulted in many economic and social problems: many non-communists were prevented from maximizing their contributions to society; social tensions and uncertainties made people extra-cautious and socialist legality was undermined.

If a variety of pro-socialist parties were allowed to share power, society could have developed in a many-sided manner. Environmental, feminist, progressive and other parties for example could have enriched the process of socialist construction.

The one-party state also hurt the ruling party itself. Since upward mobility in society was enhanced by membership in the communist party, many people joined the party without believing in its ideals. At the same time, too many of the best party members had to attend to administrative tasks, where they lost their feel of public opinion.

Reform Attempts

Once the command economy, the rapid heavy industrialization strategy and the one-party state were put in place, these features reinforced each other. It was difficult to reform one without affecting the others. The Hungarians and the Czechoslovaks, when they undertook their reforms, realized that the whole Stalinist package needed to be changed.

The Hungarian uprising of 1956 (which was an uprising against the re-imposition of Stalinism, and not against the ruling communist party) and the Prague Spring of 1968 were attempts to build socialism on a non-Stalinist basis. In both cases, the communist leaderships were well on their way to abolishing the command economy and establishing multiparty democracies (where the communist party would have been the main influence). Many defects of the heavy industrial stress were also addressed, especially the effects of these on the peasantry. Unfortunately, these attempts to develop another model of socialism were suppressed by brutal military force.

Although the Czechoslovak, Polish (in 1956, the Polish CP also attempt to adjust their economic system) and Hungarian reforms were crushed by Soviet interventions, there eventually emerged a “silent compromise” in which some degree of economic innovation, as long as the CPs political monopoly was maintained and official allegiance was given to the Soviet model.

Since EE CPs were constrained by the silent compromise, reforms were limited to correcting Stalinist excesses (note that they weren’t allowed to use the word “Stalinist”). Let us look at some of these attempts.

The introduction of profit incentives in enterprises did not result in much good. The enterprises responded by producing more “profitable” products – meaning that they came out with even more unusable goods. Profits, after all, depended on state-determined prices for the inputs and the finished products. The profit motive actually aggravated the distortions caused by the arbitrary price system.

Using international prices as a guide for domestic prices also did not succeed. For one thing, many products are not traded internationally e.g. housing, public services, utilities, and many food items. Wage rates could also not be based on other countries’ wages. Adopting international rates for these would be as arbitrary as before. The net effect of this measure was to increase the profits of firms whose products used to be cheaper than the international average, and decrease profits for those whose products were more expensive than the international prices. There was still no incentive to produce more efficiently, nor to produce the goods that the consumers needed.

In addition, international prices themselves were not really objective. They were still partly determined by the plan, since exchange rates were set by the state.

Another reform measure was to allow enterprises to retain part of their profits. Potentially, this measure had some chance of success since it introduced an incentive to enterprises to work more efficiently. Those who benefited most from the old system – heavy industries and export oriented industries – were the ones which accumulated the most profits. Some of this was invested in plant modernization and expansion, while a good part was distributed among the workers in the form of higher wages.

If the policy of allowing enterprises to retain profits was combined with mechanisms which reduced the advantage of the export and heavy industries, it might have worked. One possibility was for the government to charge interest on the capital it invested in the various enterprises. The effect of this would have been similar to introducing market prices for capital. However, this policy was ideologically unacceptable.

Partial reforms in EE mostly addressed the problems with the command economy. The strategy of heavy industrialization was not really questioned (even in Yugoslavia, which successfully abolished the command economy, the heavy industry bias remained). Perhaps this is due to the relatively smooth process of agricultural collectivization in the region.

Another possible explanation is that some EE countries (Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary) already had a good industrial base when they started with the Stalinist model. For them, there was no need to build this industrial base at the expense of other sectors of the economy. What affected these countries more was the forced reorientation of their industries to meet the Soviet Union’s needs.

The Hungarians and East Germans put forward some questions on the heavy industrialization strategy. The Hungarians wanted to develop their agriculture, because their country was well endowed with fertile lands. The East Germans had a debate whether to emphasize capital-intensive, or skill-intensive industrialization (i.e. chemical and steel versus electronics). But in essence, none really questioned the stress on heavy industry.

Political pluralism in the 1980s in EE was not the result of a conscious move of the ruling CPs. When opposition political groups were allowed to exist, this was because they were too strong to suppress (e.g. Solidarnosc). Pro-socialist opposition forces were not able to build their strength as fast as other groups during this period. Since many of the pro-socialist oppositionists were former CP members who had been expelled for their views on socialist reforms, it was easier for the government to control them.

In practice, the Chinese communists went the furthest in trying to achieve a good balance between the various sectors of the economy. Although they paid allegiance to the stress on heavy industrialization, they emphasized the need to keep agriculture and light industry growing. Furthermore, they had a policy of preventing urban wages from rising too high above rural wages: which actually meant a better deal for the peasantry. Their strict policy against government deficits, which they followed even if it caused economic recessions, lessened their problems of inflation, foreign debt, etc.. Setting up state corporations which operate on a commercial basis introduced flexibility into their command economy.

The original policy of Perestroika and Glasnost in the Soviet Union was not as far reaching as that of the Hungarians in 1956, nor of the Czechoslovaks in 1965-68. Glasnost started as an attempt to introduce socialist democracy under a one-party system. Perestroika tried to correct the problems of the command economy, and of the heavy industrialization stress (or more specifically, the problems with agriculture and consumer goods). The CPSU also saw that it was possible to drastically reduce military expenses by pursuing a new kind of diplomacy.

Unfortunately, the instruments used for implementing glasnost and perestroika – the CPSU and the economic ministries – were reluctant to implement these reforms. The attempt to reform the command economy through its own institutions (some economic ministries were actually strengthened during this period) was doomed to fail.

In the last few years, the pace of change in Eastern Europe was mostly pushed by external factors (but the forces of change were internal). This meant that de-Stalinization proceeded in an uneven and unplanned way. Political pluralism was established much faster than the command economy could be dismantled. This resulted in intense political conflicts.

The communists and other pro-socialist forces in EE faced a difficult task. If de-Stalinization was allowed to proceed too fast, anti-socialist forces would be able to push to abolish the socialist system altogether. If the pace was too slow, the people would blame them for the problems of transition. At the same time, the CPs had still to settle internal debates regarding their past mistakes.

In contrast to previous attempts at reform, the CPs in EE are no longer able to inspire their people with a vision of an improved model of socialism. This time, they are forced to maneuver in the face of public distrust, economic crisis, and internal disunity.

A Vision of Socialism

Where does all this leave us? If the command economy, the heavy industry bias and the one-party state are all parts of a wrong model, does this mean that socialism itself is wrong or unattainable? We are convinced that socialism is both desirable and attainable. What we need to do is to assess the experiences of all those who struggled to construct socialism, and to put together more developed frameworks for the socialist vision and for the road towards this vision.

While our critique of the Stalinist model forces us to question many concepts which we have long associated with socialism, there is much in our socialist vision that remain valid. It is important, at this historical juncture, to go back to the basics. To attempt to correct the shortcomings of the Stalinist model without a clear vision of the socialist goal would put us in danger of ending up not with a better socialism, but with capitalism (or worse?).

We do not need to start from scratch. The accumulated experience of more than 70 years of socialist construction is at our disposal. We are now more aware where certain economic and political arrangements under socialism would lead to. At the same time, we are also able to criticize a more advanced form of capitalism than that which faced Lenin and Stalin.

Let us take a look at what socialism could look like.

The guiding principle of socialism is often summarized in the phrase: ”to each according to their work”. While this short phrase could not fully reflect all the concepts that go into the socialist vision, it could serve as a common starting point for deriving basic components of the socialist vision.

In order to implement “to each according to their work”, the first requirement is that everyone should have work. Thus, full employment is a basic socialist feature.

Another requirement is that those who do not work could not lay claim on the surplus product of those who do work. Thus, the existence of classes (or social groups) which exploit others is not consistent with socialism.

If there are no exploiting classes, then the private ownership of the means of production (or at least those kinds that enable the owners to exploit others) should also be absent. This does not necessarily mean that the state should own all of these, but that a variety of forms of social ownership of the means of production should be in place.

All work should be compensated using an objective measure of the quality and quantity of work. Subjective factors such as sex, race, age, sexual preference, religious beliefs, etc. should not influence one’s access to work, nor the valuation of their work. All work should be subjected to this measure – thus also household, child-caring and other such work. Mental and physical work should be compensated equivalently (but not necessarily equally). Since education and health are important determinants of future work possibilities, society would need to provide good educational and health services for everyone.

Full compensation for work should also be valid across generations. The economy should not operate at the expense of future generations. The natural resource base should be conserved and even enhanced.

The whole system will not run by itself. There will have to be a very sophisticated mechanism in place for planning all the economic activities of society. This planning does not need to be of the command-administrative type. In fact, it should not be. Planning should be dynamic and flexible, with every member of society fully participating in the economic and political aspects of this process.

Lastly, a political system and a social ethic that supports this type of society is needed.

Impossible ? It indeed seems impossible, at least if we attempt to fit this vision to the possibilities of today. Humanity will not be able to build socialist society for a long time, perhaps centuries. We are still far from equipped for this future, even if only in terms of technical considerations. But this vision is not useless or utopian (notice that many details are left out in our outline of socialist society). Future generations will probably find this vision of socialism too simplistic and very incomplete. Nevertheless, such a vision is a necessary tool for measuring whether we are advancing in our efforts to build socialism, or not.

The Long Transition to Socialism

Marxists today need to have a vision for four different horizons. These are: a) the society that the revolution will immediately put in place; b) the process of building socialism; c) socialism; and d) communism. Previously b) and c) were taken together – the theory of socialism was the same as the theory of socialist construction. Our exercise of trying to specify a vision of socialism makes it clear that socialism is not in the immediate agenda (not even for advanced capitalist countries). Therefore, we probably need to create a theoretical vision for the building of socialism.

Ferrer has pointed out the need to develop a theory of socialist construction. He attributes the crisis of socialism in Eastern Europe to their attempt to build socialism without having a clear theory of socialist construction. In his proposed theoretical framework, Ferrer sees the process of socialist construction as a series of successive societies. He says: “In the final analysis... socialism is made operational by a series of visions or a series of feasible structures of society, which we might conventionally call socialist, starting with the first one being constructed from a capitalist order... “

He goes on to define the principles that would guide this process: “... socialist construction is the process of developing material forces of production, mechanisms, institutions, etc... which maximize freedom, democracy and equality. Let us posit this differently and in law-like fashion: Only if each of the successive stages in the construction of post-capitalist society maximizes freedom, democracy and equality will the process of construction move progressively and smoothly towards socialism. It follows from this that violation of the law will mean stagnation, retrogression, or counterrevolution.”

This framework could help us avoid the temptation to advance headlong into socialism. If a complete socialist transformation is not what is on the agenda immediately after the victory of the democratic (and anti-imperialist) struggle, we would be able to give more attention to the full ripening of the post-revolutionary mixed economy (and “mixed society”).

We would also be able to stop looking at the “mixed economy” as a concession to capitalism. Instead, we could view this stage (which the NDs would call the “ND stage”, but which others might refer to as “early socialism”, or some other term) as the first feasible societal structure on the road towards socialism.

Since the full ripening of this stage is not only a political, but also an economic, social and cultural phenomenon, it should be long enough. Philippine society must be given time to fully outgrow its semi-colonial and semi-feudal past before we should even consider outgrowing the “ND stage”. A reasonable period may be 15 to 20 years. By this time, a new generation of workers, who would have grown up under the new system, would have joined the labor force. Also, the bigger part of the country’s production capacity would have been built after the revolution.

The task of Marxists in this framework for socialist construction would be to ensure that society never loses sight of the socialist vision. Marxists should be continually building a consensus not only around the vision of socialism, but also about the concrete tasks faced in each of these periods.

Conclusion

The crisis of socialism has forced us to reevaluate many of our theories. Socialists all over the world face a period of great debates, a lot of uncertainty, and maybe even further setbacks. It will take some time before new , non-Stalinist models for socialist construction acquire concrete form.

In the face of all these, there is still a basis for optimism about the future. The present crisis has forced Marxists out of passivity. Since many things are now open to debate, and since Marxists are involved in a wide array of struggles all over the world, the process of ideological interchange is sure to be quite rich. In the end, the crisis of the Stalinist model will pave the way for a clearer vision of socialism.

For Philippine Marxists, we have additional reasons for optimism. Building a consensus within the Philippine left about the shape of our society after the victory of the present democratic and anti-imperialist struggle could now be much easier than before. If a spirit of openness deepens within the left, coalition work on the basis of the “mixed economy”(and even on socialism) could become quite fruitful.

Those among us who insist on closing themselves off from new ideas, who refuse to really study the new situation and to share experiences with all those who have struggled to build socialism will face a permanent crisis. For the great majority among us, the present crisis will be just a temporary detour on the road to the socialist future.